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State v. Sheldon

STATE
CROSS BURNING
STATUTE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL

32 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.2

In State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45,
629 A.2d 753 (1993), the Court of
Appeals ofMaryland struck down the
state's cross burning statute which
prohibited the burning of religious
symbols without first giving notice to
the local fire department and obtaining the permission ofthe owner of the
property on which the burning is to
occur. In an unanimous decision, the
court determined that the statute was
intended to control the expression of
ideas, as opposed to fires, and accordingly, held that the cross burning statute violated the First Amendment.
Brandon Forrest Sheldon and Thomas Eugene Cole were charged with
violating Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §
10A (1957) ("§ 10A"), which proscribed the burning of any religious
symbol on a property without the
express consent of the property owner
and notice to the fire department which
serviced the area. Sheldon had ignited
a cross on private property and Cole
had burned a cross on public property, both without obtaining the required consent and giving proper notice. Sheldon and Cole moved to
dismiss their indictments on the basis
that § IOA violated the free speech
clause of the First Amendment. The
Circuit Court for Prince George's
County granted their motions and dismissed the indictments. Prior to intermediate review ofthe matter, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari.
Before addressing the constitutionality of § 10A, the court confronted
the threshold issue of whether the act
ofcross burning constituted protected
"speech" within the First Amendment. After reviewing several decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, which recognized that
expressive conduct could constitute
"speech" ifthe conduct was intended
to express a message and there was a
high probability that the message
would be understood, the court determined that cross burning was
"speech" within the meaning of the

First Amendment. Sheldon, 332 Md.
at 50-52, 629 A.2d at 756-57.
The court began its analysis of §
10A by reviewing the three recognized standards for evaluating whether
expressive conduct is protected by the
First Amendment. Under the first
standard, a statute which is determined to be unrelated to the suppression of free expression must be evaluated by the lenient test enumerated in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968). That test upholds the
constitutionality of a statute if the
statute is: 1) within the government's
constitutionally granted powers to
create; 2) in furtherance of an important governmental interest unrelated
to the suppression of free expression;
and 3) no more than is essential to
further the government's interest.
Sheldon, 332 Md. at 53, 629 A.2d at
758 (citing O 'Brien,391 U.S. at 377).
Under the second standard, a statute
is determined to be related to the
suppression of expression, but also
"content-neutral", if that statute is
'justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech"', Id.
(quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatre,
Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)), and is
subject to "reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions." Sheldon, 332
Md. at 54, 629 A.2d at 758 (quoting
Clarkv. Communityfor Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984)).
Such a statute will be upheld under
this second standard if it is "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest," and "leave[s] open
ample alternative channels for communication of the information." Id.
Finally, a statute which is determined
to be only "content-based" is subjected to the third standard of strict
scrutiny because it is "presumptively
invalid". Sheldon, 332 Md. at 54-55,
629 A.2d at 758. Accordingly, this
third standard focuses on the
government's purpose in enacting the
statute and places the burden upon the
state to demonstrate that the statute is
narrowly drawn to serve "a compel-
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ling state interest." Sheldon, 332
Md. at 55, 629 A.2d at 758 (quoting
Perry EducationAssn. v. Perry Local Educators'Assn., 460 U.S. 37,
45 (1983)).
In its evaluation of § IOA, the
court of appeals rejected the state's
contention that the statute was not
content-based. Instead, the court
found that the statute was enacted to
protect against fires as opposed to
regulating speech, and determined that
the it required analysis under the strict
scrutiny test as a content-based statute for two primary reasons. Sheldon,
332 Md. at 55, 629 A.2d at 759.
First, the court found that the cross
burning statute did not protect the
community from fires any more than
already existing arson and trespass
laws which provided more severe penalties. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 56, 629
A.2d at 759. Second, the court determined that the legislative history of
the cross burning statute revealed that
the statute was enacted to express
political disagreement with the burning of religious symbols. Id.
Before analyzing § I OA under the
strict scrutiny test, however, the court
reviewed the three recognized exceptions to the presumption that contentbased regulations are constitutionally
invalid, in order to determine if the
cross burning statute fell within one
of these exceptions. The first exception exists "when the basis for the
content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is
proscribable." Sheldon, 332 Md. at
58, 629 A.2d at 760 (quoting R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 112
S.Ct. 2538 (1992)). The second exception encompasses content-based
statutes aimed at the "secondary effects" of the prohibited speech. Id.
(quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 48).
Third, an exception applies to situations "where totally proscribable
speech is at issue ...
[and] there is no
realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot." Sheldon,

332 Md. at 59, 629 A.2d at 761
(quoting R.A. V., 112 S.Ct. at 2547).
The court first rejected the state's
contention that § 10A fell within the
second exception in that the statute
was enacted to target only the secondary effect of fire prevention. The
court reasoned that, as it had already
determined, § 10A was preceded by
more effective fire prevention laws
and was nottruly intended as a method
of fire prevention, as its legislative
history revealed. Sheldon, 332 Md.
at 60-61, 629 A.2d at 761-62. In
addition, the court stated that this
cross burning regulation would prevent far fewer fires than regulations
on leaf burning, barbeques, or bonfires, and thus, could not be taken as
intending anything other than expressing political disagreement which such
an act. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 61, 629
A.2d at 762.
The court also promptly dismissed
the argument that the third exception
to the invalidity of content-based statutesjustified the cross burning statute
because the state had failed to demonstrate that burning religious symbols
was proscribable at all, much less as
a particular type of speech unrelated
to suppressing expression. Id. To the
contrary, the court of appeals noted
that § 1 A was related to suppressing
the expression of ideas and that both
its legislative history and its insignificant contribution to fire prevention
demonstrated that the state clearly
intended to censor forms of expression by enacting the cross burning
statute. Sheldon, 332 Md. at 62, 629
A.2d at 762.
After finding that none of the recognized exceptions justified
Maryland's content-based cross burning statute, the court of appeals subjected § I0A to the strict scrutiny test
to determine its validity. The strict
scrutiny test requires that a statute be
upheld if it is "'necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to achieve that end."'
Id. (quoting PerryEduc. Assn., 460

U.S. at 45). As justification for the
statute, the state argued that § 10A
was valid because it protected society
from bias-motivated threats and aided
in the elimination of discrimination,
both of which were compelling state
interests. After noting that this argument by the state was a complete
abandonment of its original assertions that § 1OA was not contentbased and instead only served the
purpose of fire prevention, the court
acknowledged society's interest in protecting social welfare. Sheldon, 332
Md. at 62-63, 629 A.2d at 762-63.
However, the court emphatically rejected the necessity of § 1OA to further achieve this state interest, particularly in light of the existence of
other statutes which dealt with the act
and the fact that the cross burning
statute still permitted the burning of
religious symbols with proper permission. Sheldon, 332 Md. at63, 629
A.2d at 763. In addition, the court
concluded that § IOA failed to serve
the state's compelling interest because
the statute merely forced bigoted individuals to find alternative ways of
expressing their viewpoints. Id.
In State v. Sheldon, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has stringently
adhered to our countries constitutional
foundation by striking down
Maryland's cross burning statute as
unconstitutional. In so holding, the
court has acted to prevent legislative
encroachment upon free speech without the requisite showing of absolute
necessity. Such a decision will dissuade hastily passed legislation resulting from public whim and protect
citizens from the slow deterioration of
their protected right to free speech.
- Kimberly A. Kelly
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